An Indiana beer shipping lawsuit illustrates how quickly a constitutional challenge can lose its footing when the complaint misstates the law it seeks to overturn. In Wilkinson v. Rokita, Judge James Patrick Hanlon’s November 16, 2026 order dismissed a brewery’s challenge without prejudice after calling its statutory descriptions “completely inaccurate.” The order also requires counsel to explain why Rule 11 sanctions should not follow, while the briefing reveals an additional problem the opinion does not address: a quotation that extends a wine-shipping privilege to beer.

Start with the privilege Indiana actually provides

The statutory problem begins with the second amended complaint filed by Alma Mader Brewing and three Indiana consumers, which alleged that Indiana reserved direct consumer deliveries for resident breweries. That theory depended on a limitation absent from Indiana Code § 7.1-3-2-1, which simply authorizes a permit for a person desiring to manufacture beer commercially and contains no residents-only condition.

The permit’s scope makes the problem clearer because § 7.1-3-2-7 expressly includes “an out-of-state brewer” with the appropriate permit. Subsection (5)(H) authorizes qualifying brewers to deliver “at the residence of the consumer,” while subsection (5)(A) separately permits sales and deliveries of up to 30,000 barrels annually to licensed retailers or dealers. Eligibility turns on manufacturing no more than 90,000 barrels annually for Indiana sale or distribution, with consumer deliveries limited to a half-barrel at a time. Those conditions establish the boundaries of the privilege without imposing the categorical exclusion alleged in the complaint.

With those privileges in view, the dispute turns to how delivery may occur. As the court construed the scheme, breweries “must use their own employees,” while common-carrier delivery to consumers remains unavailable on either side of the border. The plaintiffs’ opposition acknowledged that distinction by conceding “there is no facial discrimination,” then argued that the expense of long-distance employee delivery nevertheless produced discrimination in practice.

The briefing did little to clarify the complaint’s other citation problems, including its reliance on Maryland’s Constitution to describe the Indiana attorney general’s authority. Although the proposed surreply characterized that reference as a comparison between the states’ attorneys general, the complaint supplied no such explanation. The attempted clarification also introduced “27 U.S.C. § 7.1-3-2-2,” a nonexistent federal citation combining the U.S. Code with Indiana-style numbering.

The two words the wine opinion did not contain

Those citation problems extend to the plaintiffs’ treatment of Chicago Wine Co. v. Braun, 148 F.4th 530 (7th Cir. 2025). On page 3 of their opposition, they attributed “any wine or beer producer” to the decision, although Judge Easterbrook’s actual concurrence says “any wine producer (in or out of Indiana) can ship by common carrier to consumers in Indiana.” Inserting “or beer” expands the statement to the very privilege the plaintiffs sought.

That alteration matters because the opinion we previously covered discusses Indiana’s direct wine seller’s permit. Read alongside the opposition’s concession that neither Indiana nor out-of-state breweries may use common carriers, the altered quotation leaves the brief asserting and denying the same beer-shipping privilege on the same page.

Self-distribution needs an identified transaction

The later effort to recast the dispute as a “self-distribution case” did not resolve the problem of identifying the transaction at issue. The proposed surreply defined that phrase to include sales to “a retailer or consumer,” but the complaint sought consumer home deliveries and identified no proposed sale to an Indiana retailer or remedy for such a transaction. Because the statute already extends certain retailer-delivery privileges to qualifying out-of-state brewers, the broader label could not supply the missing allegations.

Even so, that pleading failure should not obscure the relevant practical-access argument in Furlong v. Brown, which we previously discussed. After trial, the Maryland court found that “the employee-delivery requirement discriminates by narrowing the market by excluding most out-of-state breweries.” (No. RDB-23-2045, Dkt. 111, at 43 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2025).) That reasoning deserved development through allegations connecting Indiana’s delivery restrictions to practical market exclusion under the governing Seventh Circuit cases.

Here, however, the court denied leave to file the surreply; on the merits, it found “only bare allegations that the burdens on commerce outweigh these benefits,” referring to Indiana’s age-verification and underage-drinking interests. Plaintiffs may amend by December 15, 2026, while counsel must respond to the Rule 11 order by November 30; sanctions have not been imposed. The opportunity to amend brings the lesson back to the complaint: a revised complaint should identify the buyer, permit, delivery method, and alleged disadvantage, then connect that disadvantage to facts showing how Indiana’s restriction burdens interstate commerce.

Case documents: Order; complaint; opposition; reply; motion and proposed surreply.

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