Quiju Chen v. John Does 1–10, et al., No. 25 C 6611, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2025) (Tharp, J.).
In an omnibus order Judge Tharp resolved a number of motions in a Lanham Act trademark “Schedule A” Doe case, providing helpful guidance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading sufficiency, the standard and burdens for dissolving a Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 preliminary injunction (PI), the handling of Rule 12(b)(1) factual jurisdictional challenges, and Rule 11 sanctions.
The Court denied defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions, finding the complaint met Rule 8’s plausibility standard by alleging a valid registration, unauthorized use in commerce via online marketplaces, and likelihood of confusion. The Court reasoned that at the pleadings stage, well-pled ownership and use/confusion allegations need not include granular transaction-level particulars to survive dismissal in Lanham Act claims, particularly where the allegations identify marketplace conduct directed at U.S. consumers.
On the motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, the Court applied the Seventh Circuit’s Centurion framework, reaffirming that courts consider the same factors as in granting injunctive relief. As an initial matter, the Court held that in this instance defendant bears the burden to show dissolution is warranted. The Court rejected defendant’s attempt to shift the burden based on the injunction’s origins as a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the TRO was converted to a preliminary injunction after notice and an opportunity to respond, which defendant chose to ignore. Practically, the ruling signals that defendants seeking to dissolve previously noticed injunctions must make a substantive showing negating likelihood of success and irreparable harm at least where they had notice before the PI was issued; bare assertions of ownership disputes or generalized hardship will not suffice to reverse a PI once issued.
On Rule 12(b)(1), the Court rejected a factual standing challenge, holding the plaintiff’s registration materials sufficed at the Rule 12 stage to establish a protectable interest, and defendants did not carry their burden to show a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court also denied Rule 11 sanctions, emphasizing that the complaint’s survival under Rules 12(b)(1) & (6) undermines claims that the filing was frivolous or for an improper purpose.
Finally, the Court granted in part a motion to strike foreign-language exhibits lacking certified translations under Fed. Rule of Evidence 604 and declined to revisit an administrative text entry issue after missed deadlines.
For practitioners, two procedural points stand out. First, when litigating motions to dissolve, anticipate a re-weighing of the factors with the moving party carrying the laboring oar absent a lack of notice to defendant in the underlying injunctive proceedings. Second, registration evidence continues to provide strong early-stage grounding for standing and Rule 12(b)(6) sufficiency; defendants challenging ownership should be prepared with competent proof, not mere competing assertions.