Qualified/Otherwise Qualified and Failure to Accommodate: Lots of Easy to Understand Thoughts Emanating from the Eighth Circuit

July 22, 2026

Before getting started on the blog entry of the week, I wanted to pass along that the Federal Bar Association has announced its award recipients for this year. I am quite honored to be the recipient of the Sarah T. Hughes Civil Rights Award (the history of that award can be found here). I pick up the award in September at the national convention in Richmond, Virginia. I also have to make a kind of a speech that I don’t typically make, which should be interesting. I do want to thank all the people along the way that have made this possible, including: my parents, my wife of 25 years, my daughter, as well as the incredible openness of numerous people involved with the Federal Bar Association for encouraging and then wanting more and more of the disability perspective. The people are too numerous to list, but I want to list a few and sincerely apologize to anyone left off. The people at the FBA include the wonderful staff from the very top on down. It also includes tremendous people that I have had the opportunity to work with on various committees, including but not limited to: Tara Norgard, Lisa Kpor, Katherine Earle Yanes (who just happens to be the 2026 FBA Kintner award winner), Bryan Bannon, Robin Wagner, Kyle Kaiser, Eric Foley, Kate Marples Simpson, Wylie Stecklow (a previous Sarah T. Hughes award winner), Stephen J. Haedicke, Lauren DiMartino, the Hon. John L. Badalamenti, all the members of the Federal Bar Association Civil Rights Board and Diversity and Inclusion Board that I’ve had the privilege to work with over time, as well as anybody else from anywhere that has gone along with this journey with me. Thank you and am truly honored.

Turning to the blog entry of the week, I really struggled with what to blog on. I came very close to blogging on a Second Circuit, Bergin v. New York State Court System, decision that added a motive requirement to the prima facie case when it comes to religious failure to accommodate cases. My thinking was the lack of ADA knowledge was a possible explanation for the holding. However, when I dug deeper, there are enough differences between the Supreme Court decisions dealing with religious accommodation matters v. the ADA statutory and common law interpretation in failure to accommodate cases, that made the analogy not work. So, I had to move on to something else. The case of the day is Klimek v. CentraCare Health System, a unanimous published decision decided on June 15, 2026, from the Eighth Circuit, here. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; plaintiff was an otherwise qualified individual with a disability; defendant didn’t persuasively make the case that remote work was an essential function of the job; plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim should not have resulted in summary judgment for the defendant; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

Facts

Christine Klimek is a registered nurse who worked for CentraCare between 2008 and 2021. In 2010, she suffered a workplace-related injury and subsequently developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome, which is also known as Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (“RSD”). According to Klimek, her RSD causes vertigo, nausea, dry heaves, chronic pain throughout her body, and a disproportionate pain response to minor injuries. It also affects her cognitive abilities, mood, sleep, and appetite. In 2016, CentraCare instituted a policy requiring all employees to get the measles, mumps, and rubella (“MMR”) vaccine. Klimek applied for a medical exemption, accompanied by a letter from her doctor supporting her request. The letter stated that “a painful stimulus like a vaccine can flare up” Klimek’s RSD, and given Klimek’s condition, “the risks of a vaccine seem to outweigh the benefits.” Based on this information, CentraCare concluded Klimek met “the criteria for a permanent medical exemption,” and should not have “live vaccinations” while being treated for RSD.

In 2021, Klimek accepted a position as a clinical documentation integrity specialist, which involved coding diagnoses and preparing medical records. She performed this work remotely from home 100% of the time. That same year, CentraCare implemented a new policy requiring the COVID-19 vaccination for every employee unless the employee obtained a medical or religious exemption. Klimek applied for a medical exemption, stating she was currently “medically exempt from any/all live or attenuated vaccinations related to a CentraCare workrelated injury resulting in a documented permanent disability and a rare condition, Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome/Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy.” She added, “This exemption has been documented and filed in my chart since August 2016. My condition is lifelong and I manage the negative effects on a daily basis.” Klimek’s provider also completed a portion of the form, stating: “Patient has RSD as well as documentation that explains her reaction to all vaccines. It is not recommended that -3- she get any vaccines due to her RSD.” Klimek also attached a separate letter from her medical provider.

In October 2021, plaintiff’s exemption request was denied without explanation, and she was advised she would be placed on unpaid administrative leave unless she received the vaccine. Plaintiff’s employer sent a letter to the plaintiff saying there was a deadline for providing relevant medical information for employees who had their exemption request denied. Plaintiff submitted that documentation within that deadline. However, the employer again denied her request without explanation and informed her that if she was not vaccinated before December 15 of 2021, she would be placed on unpaid leave. On December 3, 2021, plaintiff and her employer’s incident commander for the Covid-19 response met by teleconference to discuss the denial of plaintiff’s accommodation request. At that teleconference the incident commander said that the vaccine would be a requirement for ongoing employment with the defendant and that 100% remote work was not part of the equation for the position she had and given the location she was at. On December 16, 2021, plaintiff’s employer placed her on an involuntary unpaid leave of absence because she was unvaccinated thereby effectively ending her employment.

Plaintiff Was an Otherwise Qualified Individual with a Disability

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability, plaintiff had to show: 1) she is disabled per the ADA; 2) she is a qualified person under the ADA; and 3) she suffered an adverse employment decision because of a disability. Even thin evidence creating a disputed issue of material fact is sufficient. So, the court was correct to hold that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff’s condition qualified as a disability under the ADA.
An employer disputing a plaintiff’s claim that she can perform the essential job functions has to put forth evidence establishing those functions.
Adding the label of “policy,” to a task does not render it an essential job function, and a duty does not become essential simply by the employer’s say so.
When deciding whether a duty is an essential job function, an employer’s judgment, while probative, is merely evidence and not conclusive.
Defendant offered no explanation as to how an accommodation in the form of a medical exemption from a vaccine requirement could itself be an essential job function. That is, a qualified individual is a person who with or without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job they hold or desire. So, an accommodation cannot also be an essential function. Holding otherwise conflates two concepts contrary to the plain text of the ADA. That is, exemption from vaccination requirements are a type of accommodation and not an essential job function.
Defendant’s argument that the plaintiff spent some time in the community has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual. An unvaccinated employee spending her free time active in the community performing regular life tasks, such as buying groceries or taking a walk, is performing tasks entirely unrelated to her employment.
The essential function requirement of the ADA focuses on the desired result rather than on the means of accomplishing that result.

III

Defendant Didn’t Persuasively Make the Case That Remote Work Was an Essential Function of the Job

An essential function of the job is a fundamental duty of the employment position, which varies according to the job.
Evidence to consider in determining an essential function of the job includes: 1) the employer’s judgment as to what functions are essential; 2) written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; 3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; 4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; and 5) the current work experience of employees and similar jobs.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff showed that her position involved no physical patient care and that she was working entirely from home electronically preparing records.
Plaintiff’s job description does not indicate that in person work was contemplated. In the position’s “Core Functions,” duties included such things as identifying documentation issues and collecting data. Nothing in the job description related to physical care of patients. Defendant also failed to adequately show that there were any negative consequences of not requiring the plaintiff to perform in person patient care.

Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate Claim Should Not Have Resulted in Summary Judgment for The Defendant

Surviving summary judgment in a failure to accommodate case means a plaintiff has the burden of showing: 1) the employer knew of her disability; 2) plaintiff requested an accommodation or assistance for her disability; 3) defendant did not make a good-faith effort to assist plaintiff in seeking an accommodation; and 4) plaintiff could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.
To trigger the interactive process, the employee must provide the employer with enough information so that the employer knows of the disability and the request for an accommodation.
Defendant knew about plaintiff’s impairment because she developed her medical condition after suffering a workplace injury. Defendant has also received all of her medical records from the date of the injury until approximately 2014. Further, defendant’s workers compensation insurance covered plaintiff’s recovery and surgery costs.
The defendant also received letters from plaintiff’s treating doctor advising them of her condition and that since vaccines could cause a flareup of that condition, plaintiff should refrain from accepting the MMR vaccination to avoid possible complications. In response, the defendant determined that plaintiff met the criteria for a permanent medical exemption. Every year after that, defendant contacted plaintiff during the influenza season regarding her medical exemption reminding her to complete a flu educational module and wear a mask.
Defendant’s Covid-19 policy required employees seeking exemption to provide two pieces of information, which she did. Defendant never requested further documentation after receiving plaintiff’s documentation. For that matter, it didn’t give plaintiff any reason why she was denied a medical exemption.
Defendant was aware of plaintiff’s medical history based on prior and ongoing communications about her condition that prevented her from receiving a flu vaccination.
Defendants have previously granted plaintiff a permanent medical exemption for at least some vaccines and had knowledge of her workplace injury, and had also received her providers assessments. If the defendant needed more information beyond this, it should have requested it but did not do so.
Once an employer is made aware of a legitimate request for an accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.
Defendant admitted that it did not consider plaintiff’s work from home status or the type of work she performed when denying her request. As such, that calls into question whether the defendant made a reasonable effort to determine whether an appropriate accommodation for plaintiff’s disability could be found.
When the plaintiff questioned the incident commander on whether the vaccine would be a requirement for ongoing employment with the defendant, she insisted she had a right to continue working from home 100% remotely.
Where an employer’s directive eliminates the possibility of an accommodation, it is no longer participating in good faith to assist an employee in trying to identify a suitable accommodation.
A factfinder looking at the evidence could find it sufficient to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant blew up the interactive process. In other words, given that the defendant twice denied plaintiff’s exemption request without explanation, a jury could find that the incident commander’s offer to speak with plaintiff’s providers was not an attempt to find clarity or search for suitable accommodation because the defendant had already made up its mind thereby leaving the plaintiff with the choice of either vaccination or termination.
Plaintiff was already working from home unvaccinated and had been doing so for months. She did not work with patients or in the presence of coworkers, and her requested accommodation was to merely continue working in the exact same capacity.
Evidence in the record indicates an available reasonable accommodation under defendant’s own policies included an unvaccinated employee working from home.
Once a plaintiff makes the facial showing that reasonable accommodations were possible, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it was unable to accommodate the employee. Doing that means the employer has to show special specific circumstances demonstrating undue hardship. An undue hardship cannot be proved by hypothetical facts and must be sufficiently real rather than speculative.

Thoughts/Takeaways

An employer labeling something a policy does not turn it into an essential function of the job.
An employer’s judgment is merely evidence and not conclusive. That said, check your jurisdiction on this as jurisdictions and individual judges can vary quite a bit in terms of how much leeway they give an employer with respect to what the employer says are the essential functions of a job.
An accommodation cannot be an essential job function. They are two entirely different things.
Time spent on community activities that people typically spend time on and are unrelated to the job does not jeopardize a person’s qualified status under the ADA.
Essential functions of the job focus on the desired result rather than on the means of accomplishing that result. I can’t tell you how often I have seen employers run themselves into problems quite literally for decades now because they don’t understand this particular point.
Nothing in the job description nor in the way plaintiff historically performed the work suggested that remote work was an essential function of the job. So, up-to-date job description reflecting the reality of what the job actually does on a day-to-day basis is critical.
There are a variety of ways how court talk about what needs to be shown in order to trigger the interactive process. They all essentially amount to something very close to what this court says, which is a plaintiff has to give the employer enough information so the employer knows of the disability and the request for an accommodation.
The decision is published and therefore, is precedential.
Make sure corporate policy is followed.
With respect to how the interactive process works, see here.
Where an employer issued a directive eliminating the possibility of an accommodation, it blows up the interactive process.
Check your jurisdiction as to how it deals with the question of the burdens on an employer once a plaintiff makes a facial showing that reasonable accommodation were possible. Courts can be all over the place on that.
As a matter of preventive law, when it comes to trying to determine if remote work would be a reasonable accommodation, I really like the case that we talked about With the advent of remote work, I do think the criteria set forth in that case have to be modified slightly so what you want to be looking at is: 1) the employee must work in person as part of the team; 2) the job requires in person face-to-face interaction with clients and other employees; or 3) the job requires the employee to work with items and equipment that are on site.

Happy 36^th anniversary to the ADA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!