On April 6, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission. The denial leaves in place an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision allowing the State to tax a Muscogee (Creek) Nation member who works for the Tribe on trust land but resides on unrestricted fee land within the reservation recognized in McGirt.
The question presented was ultimately not whether McGirt recognized a reservation (it did) but instead, whether that recognition carries through to state income taxation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered no. The Court declined review.
Arguments Presented on the Petition for Certiorari
The amicus brief filed by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation framed that answer as a direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s tax precedents.
The brief situates the case within a line of decisions: McClanahan, Sac and Fox, and County of Yakima—that treat state taxation of tribal members in Indian country as governed by a categorical rule. As described in Yakima, and emphasized by the amicus, state taxation is prohibited unless Congress has made its intent to allow the tax “unmistakably clear.” That formulation is not a balancing test. It is a rule of default: no state tax within Indian country absent express congressional authorization.
The amicus relies most heavily on Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, which addressed state income taxation of tribal members living and working in Indian country. There, the Court held that the inquiry is limited: “we ask only whether the land is Indian country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. If so, the tax is barred unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. The amicus treats that as controlling here.
On that view, the dispositive question in Stroble should have been whether the relevant land falls within § 1151. McGirt answered that question, holding that the Creek Reservation persists and qualifies as Indian country. The amicus argues that once McGirt establishes § 1151 status, the tax cases resolve the rest: the State may not tax tribal members living and working within that territory absent congressional authorization.
What the Oklahoma Supreme Court Held
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not apply that framework. According to the amicus, it did not engage the Court’s tax precedents at all. Instead, it adopted two related propositions.
First, it treated McGirt as limited to the Major Crimes Act, reasoning that the decision recognizes the Creek Reservation as Indian country only for federal criminal law. Second, it held that state courts are not required to apply that determination in civil contexts (including taxation) unless a federal statute expressly directs them to do so.
The amicus challenges both propositions. It argues that McGirt did not depend on the Major Crimes Act; rather, it rested on treaties and statutes establishing and preserving the reservation. The Major Crimes Act appears in the case only as the vehicle for the criminal prosecution, not as the source of reservation status. And because § 1151 supplies the definition of Indian country across multiple contexts, including civil ones, the amicus contends that the Oklahoma court had no basis to confine McGirt to criminal law.
More directly, the brief argues that the Oklahoma Supreme Court inverted the governing rule. Under the Court’s tax cases, Congress must clearly authorize state taxation in Indian country. Under the Oklahoma approach, state taxation applies unless Congress—or a statute expressly incorporating § 1151—prohibits it. The difference is not semantic. It changes which party bears the burden and what must be shown.
The amicus also frames the issue as one of precedent adherence rather than doctrinal extension. It invokes Cooper v. Aaron for the proposition that state courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal law and cannot decline to apply them outside the precise factual context in which they arose. On that account, once McGirt establishes that the Creek Reservation meets the § 1151 definition of Indian country, and Sac and Fox establishes that state income taxation is barred in such territory, the Oklahoma court was required to apply those holdings together.
The State’s position, as reflected in the decision below and the surrounding litigation, proceeds from a different premise: that state authority is the default, and that federal limits must be tied to specific statutes or contexts. That approach aligns more closely with the Court’s reasoning in Castro-Huerta, which emphasized concurrent state authority in Indian country absent express federal preemption. The amicus does not deny that shift in other areas but argues that the Court’s tax precedents have not been displaced.
The Unresolved Conflict in the Court’s Tax Cases
The result is an unresolved conflict between two lines of authority. One treats state taxation in Indian country as categorically barred absent clear congressional authorization. The other treats state authority as presumptive unless clearly displaced. Stroble presented that conflict in a concrete setting. The Court declined to resolve it.
The denial of certiorari leaves the Oklahoma decision in place but does not settle the underlying question. The competing frameworks remain, and the relationship between them — especially in the tax context — remains open for interpretation.