Direct Evidence Cases Do Exist and Other Good Stuff

October 6, 2025

Today’s blog entry comes out of the Eighth Circuit, where just don’t see a lot of ADA cases. This case, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Drivers Management, LLC, is a published decision decided on July 10, 2025, and can be found here. The case explores several topics including: 1) direct evidence; 2) logistical undue hardship; 3) undue hardship as an affirmative defense; 4) direct threat as an affirmative defense; 5) stray remarks; 6) essential functions of the job; 7) punitive damages; 8) injunctive relief; and 9) prejudgment interest. As usual, blog is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning that plenty of direct evidence existed and so causation existed; court’s reasoning upholding the court’s summary judgment granted to the EEOC with respect to the undue hardship defense; court’s reasoning upholding district court’s summary judgment granted to the EEOC with respect to Werner’s direct threat defense; court’s reasoning that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence by non-decision-makers occurring two years after the decision was made to reject Robinson; court’s reasoning that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of other trucking companies accommodation for deaf drivers; court’s reasoning that Robinson was a qualified person with a disability; court’s reasoning that the district court did not err by submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury; court’s reasoning that the district court properly granted injunctive relief; court’s reasoning that the district court properly awarded prejudgment interest; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

Facts

The person the EEOC brought suit on behalf of was a Victor Robinson, a deaf individual.
Federal regulations require all drivers to meet specific hearing requirements in order to obtain a commercial driver’s license.
Those same federal regulations also allow an individual to obtain a medical variance from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety administration in order to obtain a commercial drivers license. Therefore, an individual who is deaf, but obtains from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration a medical variance from the physical qualification standards, is able to obtain a commercial drivers license and is physically qualified to drive a commercial vehicle under federal law.
Robinson obtained his variance in 2015 and enrolled in a driver training school owned by Werner. He successfully completed that program and obtained his commercial drivers license.
Robinson then applied to Werner for an over the road truck driver physician before finishing his training. Since he had fewer than six months of experience driving a commercial truck, Werner’s policy obligated Robinson to go through the placement driver program before becoming a solo driver. That program required new hires lacking six months of experience to drive throughout the country for 4 to 6 weeks with a trainer, delivering customer orders while receiving contemporaneous corrections and instructions while driving. According to Werner, this training program required all trainees to be able to engage in verbal communication with their trainers, as any other method of communication would result in unsafe distraction from the road.
After submitting his application, Robinson received an email from the recruiting manager, Erin Marsh, informing him that his application had been preapproved and he should contact Werner to discuss further opportunities. Robinson then called Marsh who spoke with him about the job, the orientation, providing interpreting services, and other matters.
About a week later Marsh emailed Robinson asking him to speak with Werner’s’s VP of Safety and Compliance. Marsh participated in the call with a Jamie Hamm, VP Of Safety and Compliance. Hamm testified that in preparation for the call she researched potential accommodations that Werner’s could provide safely in order to train Robinson while he participated in the placement driver program. Hamm and an investigator for the Nebraska EEOC, testified that when he asked her if she had conducted research into potential accommodation prior to speaking to Robinson, she said she had not done so. After discussing Robinson’s previous accommodation, Hamm told Robinson that he can’t be hired because of his deafness and ended the call.
After a variety of pretrial motions, the case went to a jury trial with both parties moving for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the EEOC’s motion because all of Werner’s’s explanation for its failure to hire Robinson were premised on his deafness. The case was then submitted to the jury, which found that Werner failed to hire and failed to accommodate Robinson in violation of the ADA. The jury awarded Robinson $75,000 in compensatory damages and $36,000,000 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently reduced to punitive damages to $300,000, the statutory maximum.
After the jury verdict, the case continued to a trial to determine applicable relief. After the trial, the trial court determined that Robinson was entitled to back pay and eventually determined that the EEOC was also entitled to prejudgment interest of $11,000. Finally the district court concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate given the finding of intentional discrimination.

Court’s Reasoning That Plenty of Direct Evidence Existed and so Causation Existed

Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the decision sufficient to support a finding that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.
Direct evidence most often consists of remarks by decision-makers reflecting without interference a discriminatory bias.
A review of the record confirms that there was no evidence from which a jury could conclude that Robinson was rejected for any reason aside from his deafness. In particular, Vice President of Safety and Compliance ended Robinson’s employment interview by stating, “no, I’m sorry, we can’t hire you because of your deafness.” Additionally, Werner stated in a sworn interrogatory that its position was that a deaf student driver could not safely complete the over the road training portion of Werner’s’s student driver program. That is, Werner would not hire any (emphasis in opinion), deaf applicant, including Robinson. In other words, Werner’s theory of the case was that Robinson would not qualify for the truck driver position because he was deaf (emphasis in opinion), and, as the district court noted, Werner provided no other reason to why it did not hire Robinson. Accordingly, the district court properly entered a directed verdict in favor the EEOC on the issue of causation.
No meaningful difference exists between taking an adverse action because of the job performance consequences of disability rather than the disability itself because all of the alleged consequences describe (emphasis in opinion), Robinson’s disability.
While the issue of Robinson’s qualifications was a question for the jury, Werner’s reason for failing to hire him was not.

III

Court’s Reasoning Upholding District Court’s Summary Judgment Granted to the EEOC with Respect to the Undue Hardship Defense

The ADA exempts employers from making a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that a proposed accommodation is reasonable on its face “in the run of cases,” (phrase in quotations in the opinion), the employer must show special circumstances demonstrating undue hardship.
Werner produced virtually no evidence before the District Court about how providing non-verbal cues would fundamentally alter its business (emphasis in opinion), not just the training program, nor did it cite any financial burden it would incur by accommodating Robinson.
As the District Court noted, it is unclear how nonverbal communication during training fundamentally alter the ability of a trucking company to carry goods in interstate commerce, which was Werner’s’s primary purpose. Further, it offered no evidence establishing a genuine dispute regarding a significant difficulty or expense.
Werner has the burden to prove the affirmative defense. As a result, its failure to provide any evidence at the how the accommodation would affect his business as a whole is fatal to a challenge on appeal.

Court’s Reasoning Upholding District Court’s Summary Judgment Granted to the EEOC with Respect to Werner’s’s Direct Threat Defense

When it comes to direct threat, the Supreme Court requires an individualized direct threat analysis relying on the best current medical or other objective evidence in order to protect persons with disability from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear. Specific factors to analyze include per 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(r), include: 1) the duration of the risk; 2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; 3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and 4) the imminence of the potential harm. The employer bears the burden of proof.
The only person who allegedly inquired into whether Robinson’s disability constituted a direct threat was the Vice President of Safety and Compliance, Hamm. However, it is undisputed that she did not conduct the required individualized direct threat analysis. While she testified that she called relevant trucking associations and asked if they had research on road tests with hearing-impaired individuals, she has no notes from those calls, no record of any analysis, and no evidence of any discussion about Robinson individually (emphasis in opinion), in light of his prior training as a commercial driver.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Werner, it is undisputed that Werner did not conduct the individualized analysis necessary to prove this affirmative defense. Instead, the VP of Safety and Compliance just made a few general calls to back up her prejudice, stereotypes, and unfounded fear of allowing a deaf individual to drive a Werner’s truck. A one-size-fits-all approach is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to Werner’s direct threat defense, and therefore the district court committed no error on this issue.

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Remarks by Non-Decision-Makers Occurring Two Years after the Decision Was Made to Reject Robinson

On one occasion, a Werner’s employee sent Marsh, the recruiting manager, a link to an article detailing how a deaf man obtained a truck driving job, to which Marsh responded, “this scares me to death.”
On another instance, Marsh was communicating with another recruiting manager via instant messaging and the other recruiting manager told her: “[I]’m on hold with a deaf guy.. wtf,” and proceeded to make several comments regarding this deaf applicant, including, “[others] must be trying to find him.. you know yelling his name.. but he can’t hear them” and “marco . . . nobody can here [sic] polo” to which Marsh responded, “lmao . . . omg.”
While stray remarks, standing alone, may not give rise to an inference of discrimination, such remarks are relevant. That is particularly the case here where Werner admitted (emphasis in opinion), that it did not hire Robinson because of it disability and the EEOC sought to prove Werner was motivated by animus and not safety in failing to hire Robinson. Further, the EEOC produced other evidence which, together with those comments, would allow the jury to find that Werner intentionally discriminated against Robinson for purposes of punitive damages.
The EEOC was not using those comments to prove pretext as McDonnell Douglas was not involved since direct evidence existed.
While the emails were circulated two years after Robinson’s rejection, the recruiting manager, Marsh, held the same position she held at the time of Robinson’s application and, as the district court stated, those discriminatory comments were directly relevant to Werner’s long-standing decision-making and attitude toward deaf applicants. As such, the comments provide additional threads of evidence for the jury directly relevant to animus.

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Evidence of Other Trucking Companies Accommodations for Deaf Drivers

The evidence of other companies policies and their ability to train deaf drivers safely was directly relevant to whether Robinson’s proposed accommodation was reasonable.
Werner admitted at trial that it employed experienced (emphasis in opinion), deaf drivers who did not need its training.

VII

Court’s Reasoning That Robinson Was a Qualified Person with a Disability

Federal regulations specifically allow a person that does not meet specific hearing requirements to obtain a waiver, which Robinson obtained.
The federal regulations are no longer the same from what they were when the Supreme Court decided Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, here, back in 1999. In particular, the waiver is no longer experimental and is now enshrined in the code of federal regulations and carries the full force of the law.
Werner’s essential function argument fails because the essential function requirement focuses on the desired result, i.e. safe driving, rather than the means of accomplishing it.
Robinson’s accommodation did not eliminate the essential functions of safe driving. In particular, the jury heard from two EEOC experts about how to accommodate a deaf individual while training using hand signals, and diverting one’s eyes from the road for a brief time was equivalent to the time spent checking a mirror or changing the radio. Also, several trucking company testified that they use those types of accommodations safely in their own training programs. Finally, Robinson’s own testimony supported the safety of using hand signal to communicate, as that was the accommodation he received while training to receive its commercial drivers license. As such, sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding that Robinson was qualified per the ADA.

VIII

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Did Not Err by Submitting the Issue of Punitive Damages to the Jury

To be liable for punitive damages, the employer must also know that it may be acting in violation of federal law.
Plenty of evidence existed of malice, including: 1) Marsh’s discriminatory commentary with recruiters and her involvement with Robinson’s application; 2) the Vice President of Safety and Compliance testimony about her familiarity with antidiscrimination laws, per away inquiry into accommodations, and her failure to record any information about the accommodation research; and 3) testimony from the EEOC investigator that the VP of Safety and Compliance told her that he was not hiring Robinson because he was deaf, despite his application being approved.
Punitive damages are appropriate as a matter of law where evidence was presented to the jury that a managerial employee engaged in discrimination while knowing that federal law prohibited such discrimination.

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Properly Granted Injunctive Relief

The injunction mandates that Werner report records of deaf applicant to the EEOC every six months (at a minimum) for three years and that it retain a record regarding such applications. The district court noted that the requirement do not harm Werner so long as Werner complies with the federal law by not blatantly discriminating against deaf applicants. It found that the requirements would enable Werner to avoid future lawsuits by demonstrating its good faith effort to comply with the ADA. As such, the injunction serve the public by requiring Werner to report deaf applicant directly rather than allowing Werner to wait until the victim of discrimination approaches the EEOC. Especially in light of the cap on damages, which reduced the jury award by more than 99%, the injunction might actually deter Werner from future discrimination.

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Properly Awarded Prejudgment Interest

Prejudgment interest is equitable relief for making a person whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.
Prejudgment interest is permissible despite a lack of inclusion in a pretrial brief because the finding of liability at trial places the defendants on notice that they would ultimately face monetary damages, including interest.
The Eighth Circuit has previously allowed a party to request prejudgment for the first time after trial. Since the award is equitable, the purpose of the award is to account for compensation for the inability to use the money between the time of the compensable injury and the time the award is paid. Accordingly, the district court was proper in granting the EEOC the relief to which it was entitled even though it had not demanded that relief in its pleadings.

Thoughts/Takeaways

You don’t see many direct evidence cases, but this is certainly one of them. I am a bit surprised it didn’t settle as a direct evidence case is virtually impossible for a defendant to win. Also hard to win, is defending on the grounds that a blanket policy that discriminates against a person with a disability should survive.
Blanket policies are always a bad idea.
Always do an individualized analysis, whether it be with respect to essential functions of the job or for determining a direct threat. Documenting such analysis is always a good idea.
In some jurisdictions, as we have discussed here for example, there are alternatives to McDonnell Douglas that a plaintiff can use. When direct evidence exists McDonnell Douglas and its alternatives do not even come into play.
Interesting the use by the court of italics in various places. The court was clearly bothered by the egregious conduct of Werner and wanted to add special emphasis.
The court puts “in the run of cases,” in quotation marks, which indicates to me that the court, just like myself, may not understand what the term means.
Logistical undue hardship (think fundamental alteration concept in Title II and III of the ADA), relates to the business as a whole and not to an individual part of the business.
Undue hardship is an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of proof on.
Doing research to back up prejudice, stereotypes, and unfounded fear with respect to persons with disabilities simply doesn’t cut it. Instead, always engage in the interactive process, and if you get stuck, contacting the Job Accommodation Network is certainly worthwhile.
Training, training, training by knowledgeable ADA individuals is important.
To get prejudgment interest, it doesn’t have to appear in the pretrial brief. It can be obtained after the trial.
Even long after a situation has occurred, what employees say can come back to bite you.
When it comes to essential functions, focus on what the job is trying to accomplish rather than on the tasks typically associated with accomplishing that job. I can’t tell you how often I’ve seen employers make this mistake. It happens more than you would think.
Damage caps are under debate in Congress. It may take a change in control of political parties for anything to happen on that, but that remains to be seen. We recently explored a case of how a federal court was able to maneuver around the damage caps, here. In this situation, there wasn’t an analogous state law that the court could turn to. That said, that the ceiling on damages reduced the jury award by 99% with respect to punitive damages, was a significant factor in why the court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief.
The decision is unanimous, and it is also published. As a published decision, it can be freely cited as precedent.
In Albertson’s, the court held that mitigating measures inherent to an individual could be factored in when deciding whether a person has a disability (this aspect of the decision has been overturned by the amendments to the ADA). In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the decision should have been decided with respect to federal regulation governing the trucking industry as the ADA does not preempt safety regulation by other federal regulatory bodies.
Knowledgeable ADA legal counsel is always a must. The ADA can get terribly complicated, though this should not have been one of those situations for either HR or for legal counsel.
The court uses small deaf and not Deaf, but one wonders from the opinion if Robinson was not Deaf; cap D and small d are not the same thing at all. It also uses the term “hearing-impaired,” with drives many of us in the hearing loss community absolutely batty. We prefer D/deaf and hard of hearing.