Can Police Escape Liability if They go About the Situation Nicely Regardless of Statutory Provisions

Before getting started on the blog entry for the week, there is a reason why the blog entry is late this week. I was out of town visiting family Monday through Wednesday of this week. Then, I spent Thursday catching up on things. So, the blog entry is coming at the end of the week. Today’s blog entry comes to me courtesy of Prof. Leonard Sandler, a clinical law professor at the University of Iowa. It discusses the situation of what happens when a person with a service animal shows up at a business, get kicked out of the business, the police get involved but don’t know the law, and the individual winds up suing both the police and the business for ADA violations. The case of the day is Taylor v. K N B’s Inflatable’s Please, LLC, decided by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on February 25, 2025 (Taylor v. K N B’s Inflatables Please, LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33696). As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; service dogs overview under Title II of the ADA; service dogs overview under Pennsylvania law; court’s reasoning granting summary judgment for Borough of State College with respect to Taylor’s Title II of the ADA claim; court’s reasoning granting summary judgment to Borough of State College with respect to the aiding and abetting claim under Pennsylvania statute; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the sections.

I

Facts

Taylor is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War and relies on a service animal to aid with PTSD and his physical conditions, including those related to his mobility. His service animal is with him every step of the way.

One day, his grandson said to him let’s go to the bounce house, and they traveled to the Nittany Mall in College Township, Centre County, Pennsylvania. The defendant operates a kids playground business at the mall, which includes several bounce house inflatable structures. Taylor intended to watch his grandson play in the bounce houses. Taylor’s wife, daughter, and son-in-law were also present, though they drove separately and entered the business later.

When Taylor attempted to enter the business with his service animal, the owner of the business told Taylor to leave. He advised Taylor that no dogs were allowed in the business at the direction of the business’s insurer. The individual also told Taylor that if he did not leave, the business would have them arrested. An owner of the business may have also called the police.

The plaintiff then spoke with the mall security employee who advised Taylor that the business was wrong, but also told him that the mall could not address the issue. Taylor then called 911. A patrol officer for the state college Police Department responded to the call. Taylor advised the officer that he was a disabled veteran, the dog was his service dog, and that he was denied entry into the business because of his service dog. He also said he wanted access to the store. The patrol officer responded firmly that she could not force the business to allow him in. For the next 14 minutes, Taylor and the officer engaged in a vigorous discussion over the issue that ultimately ended respectfully and cordially.

At one point during the discussion, the patrol officer told the plaintiff to show her in the Crimes Code where it is a criminal matter at her level, and she would definitely enforce it, but it was not such a criminal matter. That assessment turns out to be wrong because the Pennsylvania Crimes Code makes it a summary offense to deny people access to certain businesses when they are using service dogs to assist with the disability. It is undisputed that the patrol officer did not advise the business that they were committing a summary offense by excluding Taylor from the premises because of a service dog. The patrol officer did not detain, arrest, or chart Taylor with any crimes.

The business owner told the officer that he had no problem with service animals, but his insurance company would not allow them in the business.

Taylor brought suit against the business under Title III of the ADA, a suit that the business never responded to, and against the police force (Borough of State College), for violating Title II of the ADA. Borough of State College filed a motion to dismiss.

II

Service Dogs Overview under Title II of the ADA

1. DOJ issued regulations applicable to service dogs under Title III of the ADA in 1991 and then made them applicable to public entities (Title II), in rules published in 2010.
2. Both set of regulations (§§28 C.F.R. §§36.302(c), 136 (a)), provide that policies, practices, or procedures need to be modified to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability. While there are exceptions as to when a service dog must be allowed, if those exceptions are inapplicable, a person with a disability use of a service animal is reasonable under the ADA as a matter of law.

III

Service Dogs Overview under Pennsylvania Law

1. The Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute directly addresses the use of support animals by individuals with disabilities. In particular, the Gen. Assembly has declared that the opportunity for an individual to obtain all the accommodation, advantages, facilities and privileges of any public accommodation without discrimination because of the use of a support animal because of the physical handicap of the user is a civil right enforceable by the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act.
2. The Pennsylvania Human Rights Act makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for a business to refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person due to the use of a guide or support animal because of physical handicap of the user either directly or indirectly, any of the accommodation, advantages, facilities or privileges of the public accommodation, resort or amusement.
3. Under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act the term “public accommodation, resort or amusement,” specifically references businesses like the one involved in this case in several different ways.
4. Pennsylvania has also made it a summary offense for businesses to exclude individuals using service or support animals to assist with their disability. Summary offenses are punishable by up to 90 days imprisonment and a fine of up to $300 if no higher fine is established. Under Pennsylvania law and its rules of criminal procedure, summary offenses are enforceable by law enforcement officers who institute summary proceedings by citation.

III

Court’s Reasoning Granting Summary Judgment for Borough of State College with Respect to Taylor’s Title II ADA Claim

1. To succeed with his Title II ADA claim, Taylor has to show: 1) he is a qualified individual; 2) with a disability; 3) excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, program, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; and 4) that such exclusion or discrimination occurred by reason of the disability.
2. Taylor had not demonstrated that the patrol officer discriminated against him in her response to the incident.
3. The patrol officer in her deposition admitted that in retrospect, imposing a summary offense on the business would have been appropriate for what occurred.
4. The patrol officer did not enforce any laws in her response to the incident. She did not cite the business for violating the criminal code, but she also did not cite Taylor. While Taylor contends that the patrol officer threatened to arrest him for trespassing, that claim cannot even be inferred from the body cam video.
5. In the quarter hour the patrol officer interacted with Taylor in the middle of the mall, she said many things, but she did not threaten to charge Taylor with trespassing. Any discussion of trespassing occurred in a hypothetical sense.
6. During the conversation, the patrol officer deferred to de-escalation techniques and the civil process. She chose to diffuse the situation at hand between Taylor and the business in order to prevent a larger disturbance at the mall. In that sense, the patrol officer treated all parties equally.
7. The patrol officer did not force Taylor to leave the business. Taylor left at the direction of the business. The patrol officer also did not prevent Taylor from accessing the business. Rather, the patrol officer encountered Taylor in the common area of the mall after Taylor had already departed.
8. Under the circumstances, the failure of the patrol officer to impose summary proceedings or to ensure that Taylor could enter the store does not evidence discrimination by the police officer. She referred Taylor to civil recourse against the business. As such, none of this reflects a violation of Title II of the ADA.
9. Cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable. For example, Taylor has not demonstrated that local authorities previously impeded his access into a public building or another place of public accommodation.
10. In a case that could be found in an Understanding the ADA blog entry in the comment section before Understanding the ADA migrated over to LexBlog, the court cited to Gipson v. Popeye’s Chicken & Biscuits, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1303, which also involved a very similar fact pattern where the police were called and behaved similarly after they were called. The Gipson court said that the police provided equal services to both the plaintiff and the restaurant manager. Further, that court said that if the court were to determine the plaintiff was denied services based on his disability because the officer did not convince the restaurant manager that the plaintiff and her service dog to remain in the restaurant, the police would become responsible for sorting out civil liabilities. Further, that court said that there could be no expectation that police officers are equipped to address that type of situation when responding to a disturbance call. County police officers are not civil lawyers.
11. While the patrol officer did not cite the business for violation of the Pennsylvania criminal code, she did advise the plaintiff about his ADA rights and civil remedies. She also agreed with Taylor when he asserted that he would go to the media, and even advised Taylor that he should go on social media as well. She also informed Taylor that she would document the incident and that he could subpoena the police report for the civil action he stated he would bring against the business. Accordingly, Taylor cannot demonstrate public services discrimination by the patrol officer in her response to the incident.

IV

Court’s Reasoning Granting Summary Judgment to Borough of State College with Respect to the Aiding and Abetting Claim under Pennsylvania Statute

1. Taylor’s aiding and abetting theory of liability relies upon a lone allegation that the police also aided and abetted the business in its discrimination and directly and indirectly discriminated against the plaintiff by threatening the plaintiff with arrest if he tried to enter the business with the support animal. Otherwise, this count is exactly the same as his Title II ADA count. Unfortunately for Taylor, the facts, as mentioned earlier in this blog entry, simply don’t support the claim. So, summary judgment gets granted on that claim as well.

V

Thoughts/Takeaways

1. This case seems to suggest that the police are free to ignore relevant state criminal code violations, if they exist, as well as the ADA providing they go about the situation nicely.
2. As mentioned above, I previously mentioned the Gipson case as a comment to a blog entry. Unfortunately, the comment section of Understanding the ADA disappeared shortly after I migrated to LexBlog. Apparently, there is now a way to turn that feature back on, which is now under consideration.
3. I was part of a panel at the last Federal Bar Association convention, held in Kansas City, where the panelists discussed how it might make sense in many situations to migrate §1983 claims to Title II of the ADA claims instead for a variety of reasons. This case actually suggests the opposite. That is, it might make sense in some situations to pursue a §1983 claim rather than a Title II of the ADA claim. After all, the police officer was operating under the color of law and did not issue a citation that should have been issued, even by her own testimony.
4. The case clearly illustrates the need for police to be trained (training is a frequent issue in §1983 cases as well), on the various rules involving service animals (there are actually four different paradigms involved: Title I of the ADA; Titles II-III of the ADA, the Fair Housing Act; and the Air Carrier Access Act, though I realize that police officers would most likely not get involved with Air Carrier Access Act Enforcement).
5. While it is true that police officers are not civil lawyers, Pennsylvania does have a statute that made the denial of entry for Taylor with his service dog to the business a summary offense. Summary offenses (check your jurisdiction to see if it has such a statute or a statute making it a misdemeanor because not all jurisdictions do), are most certainly within a police officer’s purview.
6. The default motion against the place of business has been refiled. Considering this opinion, it is hard to believe that the business won’t settle or will not allow the default motion to proceed. The opinion basically says that the business blew it under Title III of the ADA and is fortunate that it was not criminally cited. Such a statement from the court is not conducive to a defense by the business.
7. The opinion is a memorandum opinion, so as far as I can tell, it is not published.
8. Interesting thought arises about whether the family could have claimed their own claim for association discrimination against the business and/or the police force.
9. We recently discussed, here, how an insurer’s policy is not a get out of jail free card for failing to allow an animal that is an accommodation for a disability.
10. I am not a Pennsylvania licensed attorney.