ABSTRACT: The Missouri Court of Appeals held that while a defendant’s speed at the time of a motor vehicle accident is, of course, relevant to a showing of negligence, the trial court’s admission of evidence of the defendant’s participation in an unrelated street race was erroneous and prejudicial.
In Childers v. Williams, the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals had occasion to review the standard for the admissibility of evidence of pre-accident speeding in a vehicle collision case. The Court applied existing Missouri precedent, that “evidence of a driver’s speed is relevant to a collision if it relates in such a way that the conduct of the driver may be said to be continuous,” and that “[t]he only relevant evidence of speed is the speed immediately before the collision.” Applying these standards, the Court of Appeals held that a St. Charles County Circuit Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a street race that occurred prior to and was unrelated to the collision at issue. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the trial court finding the evidence was so inflammatory and prejudicial that it warranted a new trial.
Background
Clayton Childers, Noah Williams, and an unnamed witness were all leaving work together when Childers, who was driving a motorcycle, and the witness, who was driving a car, made a bet with one another to race. After the race concluded, and after exiting the highway and stopping at a stoplight, the three continued a short distance to a gas station to pay the bet when Willliams’ car collided with the rear of Childers’ motorcycle.
Childers sued in St. Charles County for the damages sustained in the accident. Before trial, Childers filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence referring to his participation in the race. The trial court heard arguments on the motion and decided to take it with the case but noted that any evidence of the race was likely inadmissible if used to show Childers had been speeding before the accident, but that the evidence would be more likely admissible if it could be shown the speed or reckless driving was connected to the collision.
During the trial, several objections to evidence of the race were sustained, but the court allowed testimony about the race to be admitted through direct examination of Williams:
Q: How close were [Witness] and Clayton Childers with you as you left Firestone?
A: When we got onto the highway they were close by but then they raced.
Plaintiff’s Counsel: Objection, [y]our Honor. We’ve been through this before. It’s irrelevant and prejudicial.
The Court: Overruled.
Q: (By [defense counsel]): You saw them racing?
A: Yes
Q: Could you keep up?
A: No
Childers did not request the testimony be stricken or request a curative instruction despite there being no dispute the race was not related to the collision. After a two-day trial, the jury reached a verdict assigning no fault to Williams. Childers then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the race because it was irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and inflammatory.
Reviewing the factual record, the Eastern District Court of Appeals found that the evidence of the race in Childers was not relevant “as it was an isolated event unconnected to the collision.” The Court held the prejudicial effect of allowing the evidence to be admitted was so inflammatory that even had Childers’ requested the testimony be stricken or for an instruction, the prejudicial damage could not be undone, and a new trial was warranted.
Take Aways
For motor vehicle accident cases in Missouri, evidence of pre-accident speeding may be relevant for the purpose of establishing speed at the time of a collision, but only if it can be shown to be connected to or to have contributed to the accident itself. Further, a Missouri trial court may potentially abuse its discretion if it admits any such unrelated, inflammatory evidence.
Quoting prior case law, the Court of Appeals stated that: “Because the speed of a vehicle may be altered, proof of its speed at one point does not prove speed at another unless there is a factor which offers a finding or inference that the speed was constant.” Because there was no evidence to suggest the prior excessive speed continued in any way connected to the accident at issue in Childers, the Court of Appeals reversed the verdict in Plaintiff’s favor and remanded the case for a new trial.