Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the five civil and two criminal opinions handed down Friday, January 19, 2024, by the Illinois Supreme Court.

People v. Frey, 2024 IL 128644

By Jay Wiegman, Assistant Appellate Defender

The Post Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122 1(a)(1), provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to assert a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois, or both. At the first of three potential stages of post-conviction proceedings, the circuit court must, within 30 days of its filing, independently review the post-conviction petition and shall dismiss it if it is “frivolous or is patently without merit.” Id. § 122 2.1(a)(2). The petition advances to the second stage – at which counsel may be appointed to represent a pro se defendant – if either (1) the court fails to rule on the petition within 90 days, regardless of the petition’s merit, or (2) the facts alleged in the petition state an arguable claim of constitutional deprivation. People v. Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 32. In People v. Frey, 2024 IL 128644, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the former circumstance – in which the case advances to the second stage because the circuit court failed to timely act at the first stage – when deciding  whether counsel who determines that he must ethically withdraw at the second stage is required to explain why each of the petitioner’s pro se claims lacks merit. A unanimous Court held that Frey failed to rebut the presumption that post-conviction counsel substantially complied with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) when he filed a 651(c) certificate, in which counsel certified he had consulted with the petitioner to ascertain his contentions that he was denied a substantial constitutional right, had examined the record of trial proceedings, and made necessary amendments to the post-conviction petition.

On direct appeal from his convictions of predatory criminal sexual assault, defendant contended that his was a close case and, to support that claim, stated that the record showed two notes from the jury to the judge, the second of which indicated that the jury was initially deadlocked, but was not mentioned by the court, although the first note was discussed extensively in the trial court. After Frey’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a pro se post-conviction petition, in which he alleged that trial counsel had been ineffective and his sentence was excessive under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant also attached an affidavit from his sister, who said she believed her brother’s due process rights had been violated when the judge denied a late night request from the jury, which she claimed sent a note saying it was deadlocked 10-2, to go home for the night.

Because the circuit court did not rule on the petition within 90 days, the matter advanced to the second stage of post-conviction proceedings, and counsel was appointed to represent petitioner. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw and explained why petitioner’s claims challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel and appellate counsel, as well as his sentencing claim, lacked merit. Counsel did not address the affidavit provided by petitioner’s sister. Counsel also filed a certificate that complied with Rule 651(c). The circuit court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and, after a hearing, granted the State’s motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition.

The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the post-convection petition, finding that post-conviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance because his motion to withdraw failed to address petitioner’s due process claim concerning the jury note. In doing so, the appellate court stated that while a post-conviction petition may advance to the second stage either on its merits or, as here, because the trial court failed to act within 90 days, counsel’s duty is the same; specifically, counsel must address all of the pro se petitioner’s claims even when counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal.

Writing for the Court, Justice Rochford traced the history of the two lead cases regarding post-conviction counsel’s duties when counsel determines that a pro se post-conviction petitions lacks merit. Taken together, these cases, People v. Greer, 212 Ill.2d 192 (2004), and People v. Kuehner, 2015 IL 117695, establish that whether a petition advances to the second stage based on judicial inaction or whether it advances because the circuit court found potential merit to the claims, a properly filed motion to withdraw is one that sets forth why the claims lack merit. But while counsel’s obligation is the same in either circumstance, the consequences of filing a defective motion to withdraw are different. Where, as in Kuehner, the post-conviction petition advances based on a trial court finding that the claims are potentially meritorious but counsel failed to address one of those claims in the motion to withdraw, reversal is automatically required. Conversely, where, as in the instant case and as in Greer, the petition advanced to the second stage because the court failed to rule on it within 90 days, reversal is not required when it appears that counsel has fulfilled his duties under Rule 651(c), and the record showed the petition was frivolous and without merit. The Court further determined that the due process claims the appellate court found were set forth in the pro se post-conviction petition did not warrant appointed counsel’s attention because they were not “specific, substantial, and sufficiently present in the petition,” as required by Kuehner. As a result, the Court concluded that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance arising from counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate.

State ex rel. Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 2024 IL 128763

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In State of Illinois ex. rel. Kwame Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 2024 IL 128763, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the scope of the Illinois Antitrust Act and whether labor services are excluded from the Act’s coverage. The Attorney General is tasked with enforcing the Act’s provisions and it filed a lawsuit against three staffing agencies that provided temporary workers to the same home improvement business. The lawsuit alleged that the staffing agencies violated the Act when they agreed to fix the wages for their employees at below-market rates and when they agreed not to hire each other’s employees. The complaint alleged that this was a violation of section 3(a)(1) of the Act because it was an agreement between competitors to fix the price paid for services.

The defendant staffing agencies filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants argued that the definition of the term “services” contained in section 4 of the Act, which contained an exclusion for “labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others,” excluded labor-related services from the provisions of the Act. The trial court denied the motion but certified two questions for interlocutory appeal. The first of the two questions focused on whether the term “service” contained in section 4 applied to the Act in its entirety and whether it excluded all labor services from the Act’s coverage. (The second question was not at issue in the supreme court and is not discussed here.)

The appellate court re-phrased the certified question and instead focused on whether the definition of “service” contained in section 4 excluded the labor-related services provided by temporary staffing agencies. The appellate court reasoned that the legislature narrowed the definition of “service” to allow individuals to participate in collective bargaining, which it explained was conduct that would otherwise be considered anti-competitive. Based on this, the appellate court held that the exemption contained in section 4 did not extend to services provided by staffing agencies. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. The Court also allowed amicus briefs from the United States Department of Justice, Raise the Floor Alliance, National Legal Advocacy Network, National Employment Law Project, Staffing Services Association of Illinois, and American Staffing Association.

The Illinois Supreme Court, as requested by the parties, focused on the language of the question initially certified by the circuit court and not the question as it was re-framed by the appellate court. The Court explained that the question certified by the circuit court asked the court “to decide whether the Illinois Antitrust Act excludes from its coverage all agreements concerning labor services.” In order to answer the question, the Court noted that it was required to interpret five sections of the Act: sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 11. Further, because section 11 of the Illinois Act referenced federal antitrust law, the Illinois Supreme Court also consulted federal antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The Court noted that the federal courts, in interpreting the federal antitrust laws, have taken a commonsense approach that focuses on contracts that “unreasonably restrain competition” or that are “plainly anticompetitive.” Following this rationale, the Court concluded that plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant staffing agencies agreed to fix the wages they would pay their employees “falls squarely within the realm of conduct so clearly anticompetitive that it violates antitrust law without further examination under the rule of reason.” Thus, the Court concluded that the multi-employer agreement to restrict wages and not to hire each other’s employees violated section 3 of the Act unless that conduct was exempted under section 4.

The Court then considered the language of section 4 and noted that a plain reading “appears to exempt from antitrust scrutiny all agreements concerning wages and conditions of employment, regardless of their anticompetitive effects.” The Court explained, however, that its analysis could not end there because such a reading of the statute “conflicts with the stated purpose of the act,” which was to “promote the unhampered growth of commerce and industry.” Thus, when considering the Act as a whole, the definition contained in section 4 was ambiguous “because of the conflict between the apparent reach of the exemption on superficial examination and the purpose of the act.” To resolve this ambiguity, the Court considered a number of sources including the legislative history, legal commentary, and both federal and state antitrust laws, as well as the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act.

The Court ultimately concluded that while the definition of “service” contained in section 4 applies to the Act in its entirety, it does not exclude all agreements concerning labor services from the Act’s coverage. The Court explained that multi-employer agreements concerning wages paid to employees and the hiring of employees may violate the Act unless the agreement arises as part of a bargaining process and the affected employees, through their bargaining representatives, have sought to bargain with the multi-employer unit. Having answered the certified question, the Court remanded the matter for further proceedings. The unanimous opinion was written by Justice Neville and Justice Cunningham took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

City of Rock Falls v. Aims Industrial Services, LLC, 2024 IL 129164

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In this case involving the management of wastewater, the Illinois Supreme Court considered when it is appropriate for a trial court to balance the equities in the enforcement of a municipal ordinance. Specially, the City of Rock Falls passed an ordinance requiring that all properties in the city abandon private sewage disposal systems and connect to the public sanitary sewer. This requirement did not go into effect immediately for properties with private sewage systems but was triggered by the sale or transfer of property. Further, the ordinance required the owner of the property to pay the cost of connecting to the public sewers. The ordinance stated that violations of the code could be abated by “injunctive or other equitable relief.”

In March 2017, Defendant Aims Industrial Services, LLC purchased a commercial property located within the City of Rock Falls. At the time of purchase, the property did not connect to the city’s public sewage disposal system, but rather used a private sewer system. Aims refused to comply with the city’s ordinance and the city initiated legal proceedings seeking a mandatory injunction requiring Aims to comply with the ordinance. The circuit court held a bench trial and concluded that the city had established that the ordinance applied to the property owned by Aims. Nevertheless, the trial court denied the city’s petition. The trial court explained that it was “sitting as a court in equity” and, as a result, was required to balance the equities between the parties when ruling on the city’s request for injunctive relief. The trial court found that there had been no proof that the private sewage system posed a threat to public health and that connecting the property to the public sewage disposal system would be expensive and impose a hardship on Aims. The trial court also noted that the city had granted exceptions in the past. Taking these factors into consideration, the trial court denied the city’s petition for injunctive relief.

The city appealed and the Fourth District Appellate Court reversed. The appellate court found that the trial court erred when it balanced the equities, explaining that when an ordinance is violated, the governmental agency seeking the injunction is only required to show that the ordinance was violated and that the ordinance specifically provided for injunctive relief. In reaching that result, the appellate court declined to follow County of Kendall v. Rosenwinkel, 353 Ill. App. 3d 529, 539 (2004) where the appellate court had held that a trial court may balance the equities even when a statute expressly authorizes a governmental agency to seek relief. The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted by the Illinois Supreme Court.

The sole issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether appellate court erred when it held that the trial court lacked the authority to weigh the equities. The City of Rock Falls urged the court to follow the rule that had been set forth by it in Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264 (2003). In Cryns, the court recognized the distinction between a suit seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the court’s inherent equitable authority and one seeking relief pursuant to statute. The Illinois Supreme Court followed this rationale and explained that in the latter scenario, “the equities have, in effect, already been balanced by the legislative body” and, as a result, “that balance is reflected in the policy choices contained within the statute.” In this scenario, the Court is not free to disregard the policy determinations made by the legislative body. The fact that Cyns dealt with the application of a statute rather than a municipal ordinance made no difference to the court because “[l]ike a statute, the sewage ordinances at issue in this case were enacted by a legislative body and have the full force of law.” The Court then went on to overrule Rosenwinkel.

The Court then reiterated the position it took in Cyns and held that where a municipal code expressly authorizes a governmental body to seek injunctive relief to correct violations of the code then the only issue to be resolved by the trial court is whether the city has met its burden of establishing a continuous violation. Thus, it found that the appellate court correctly held that the trial court had no discretion to engage in a balancing of the equities.

Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC v. Stretch’s Sports Bar & Grill Corp., 2024 IL 129277

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

In the second of two decisions addressing appellate jurisdiction, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the effect of a notice of appeal that is electronically filed before the 30-day deadline but rejected by the circuit court and resubmitted, resulting in a notice of appeal date-stamped after the deadline. In a decision that provides a cautionary tale for any appellate practitioner, the Court concluded that a litigant must then seek relief under the Supreme Court rules to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Here, plaintiff failed to seek recourse, and lost its right to appeal.

The appeal arose from the circuit court’s judgment, following a bench trial, for the defendant in an eviction proceeding. The court entered judgment for defendant on March 1, 2021, and memorialized its ruling with a written order entered on March 2. Counting from the date of the written order, the appellate court determined April 1 as the due date for a notice of appeal. Plaintiff argued that it electronically submitted the notice of appeal, with the circuit court’s written order attached, on April 1, but the clerk’s office rejected the filing based on a local rule requiring litigants to submit documents separately, not as a single PDF. Plaintiff further argued that it resubmitted the notice of appeal on April 1, but the clerk’s office erroneously stamped it as filed on April 6.

Both the appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court held that the record required dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Although the defendant did not file a brief in the Supreme Court, the Court determined that it could easily decide the case on plaintiff’s brief alone and addressed the jurisdictional issue. First, the Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiff’s arguments concerning the facts establishing jurisdiction lacked support in the record on appeal. For its factual contentions, plaintiff relied on documents contained only in an appendix to its brief and failed to meet its burden, as appellant, to submit a record supporting its claim of error. Supreme Court Rule 342 prohibits placing documents outside the record in an appendix to its brief.

Second, the Illinois Supreme Court found plaintiff’s due process argument unavailing because plaintiff failed to employ either of two possible procedural remedies. Supreme Court Rule 9(d)(2) provides that, “[if] a document is rejected by the clerk and is therefore untimely, the filing party may seek appropriate relief from the court, upon good cause shown.” While noting but not resolving a disagreement in the appellate court as to whether Rule 9(d)(2) can be used to establish jurisdiction over an untimely filed notice of appeal, the Supreme Court observed that, assuming the truth of plaintiff’s argument that the circuit court clerk erroneously applied local rules in rejecting its submission, plaintiff could have made a compelling case of “good cause” under Rule 9.  Similarly, the Court observed that plaintiff failed to file a Rule 303(d) motion asserting “a reasonable excuse” for the late filing; had plaintiff done so within 30 days after the time for filing a notice of appeal, under its version of the events, it may well have established a “reasonable excuse.”

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund v. Pritzker, 2024 IL 129471

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

A 2020 amendment to the Illinois Pension Code consolidated all applicable local police and firefighter pension fund assets into two statewide pension investment funds, one for police and the other for firefighters. All of the funds were required to transfer custody and investment responsibility for their assets to the appropriate statewide fund by June 30, 2022. Each local fund retains a separate account in the appropriate fund.  The assets are to be used only to pay benefits to the local funds’ members, and to pay operating expenses. The purpose of the act is to streamline investment and eliminate redundant costs. None of the approximately 650 local funds were eliminated. Each of the local boards of those funds retained the unfettered right and responsibility to determine eligibility for benefits.

This Kane County action challenged that legislation, asserting violations of the Pension Protection and Takings clauses of the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs (who will be described in a moment) alleged that they were deprived of the exclusive right to manage the funds, that their voting power on investments and costs was diluted, and that the funds were burdened with the costs of the transition process.

Generally stated, plaintiffs’ claims were rejected by the circuit, appellate, and supreme courts. Here, the Illinois Supreme Court, in line with action of the appellate court, affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of defendants. Chief Justice Theis wrote for the unanimous court.

Plaintiffs are 36 active and retired beneficiary members from a number of suburban and downstate pension funds. The complaint had also named as plaintiffs 18 local funds. The circuit court dismissed those plaintiffs for lack of standing. No appeal was pursued from that ruling.

The Illinois Supreme Court began its rejection of the pension protection clause argument by noting that something which qualifies as a benefit from membership in a pension or retirement system cannot be diminished or impaired, and that benefits outside of payments which might constitute benefits subject to protection are those that affect a participant’s ability to continue participation or to increase service credits, thereby negatively affecting calculation of benefits. The ability to vote in local elections or to have local board members control the funds are not such rights. As was held in Kanerva v Weems, 2014 IL 115811, the clause protects a right to receive the promised benefits, not the adequacy of the funding to pay for them.

Similar thinking was applied to the contention regarding payment of the transition and operating costs of the new funds. The Court said that plaintiffs had not explained how those contentions impairs the payment of benefits. Additionally, the beneficial intent of the consolidation was likely to ensure that more money would be available to fund benefits.

As to the Takings clause challenge, the Court said that plaintiffs had failed to identify an affected property right. The assets of the funds were not taken. Rather, management of the funds was changed from one government entity to another. Additionally, the right to the payment of benefits was not impaired, thus not taking a benefit. Even if plaintiffs’ had a property right in the funds, which they do not, the funds were not taken for government use.

In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

On the same day, the Illinois Supreme Court filed two opinions addressing appellate jurisdiction. In the first opinion, construing an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(a), the supreme court limited the appellate court’s jurisdiction to the intermediate final judgment that the circuit court certified for appeal. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review prior orders, including the denial of several motions for substitution of judge.

The appeal arose from rulings in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Over more than a decade, DuPage County circuit court judge Timothy McJoynt addressed Masud Arjmand’s petition to dissolve his marriage to respondent Muneeza Arjmand. The many issues before the court included the parties’ rights with respect certain investment assets, which resulted in Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC’s intervention in the case. Disputes with Morgan Stanley resulted in the petitioner filing a separate action in Cook County, an action the court dismissed as an improper collateral attack on Judge McJoynt’s rulings that restricted the petitioner’s access to his assets. In other rulings the petition for dissolution was granted without incorporating the parties’ marital settlement agreement, which the respondent argued was unconscionable, and several motions for substitution of judge for cause were denied.

The order certified for Rule 304(a) interlocutory appeal pertained to dismissal of a complaint the petitioner filed against Morgan Stanley and respondent’s lawyers, and a motion to reconsider those rulings. Petitioner’s notice of appeal cited the order denying reconsideration of the dismissal order and “all orders in [the] procedural progression leading to it.”  In a summary order, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. The appellate court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that dismissal of the Cook County action barred the DuPage complaint against Morgan Stanley and respondent’s lawyers. In the only ruling at issue in the supreme court, the appellate court also dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction petitioner’s challenge of the orders denying the substitution requests and the denial of his petition, orders which were not the basis of the Rule 304(a) finding.

The Illinois Supreme Court recounted in detail the history of Rule 304(a), which permits appeal of a portion of a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims for relief, and the prerequisites for a finding of finality under the rule: an order that disposes of the rights of the parties upon the entire controversy as to those parties or some definite and separate part of it. A circuit court’s finding does not confer finality upon an otherwise non-final order; the court’s finding only makes a final order appealable where that order does not dispose of the entire case.

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the conflicting opinions of the districts of the appellate court regarding whether it has jurisdiction over rulings on requests for substitution of judge in conjunction with an appealable interlocutory order. The Illinois Supreme Court also discussed two of its prior opinions, In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, and Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427 (1979). In each of those cases, denial of a petition to substitute was “a step in the procedural progression” leading to the final judgment specified in the notice of appeal, and the controversy involved only whether the appellant employed language in the notice of appeal sufficient to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction. By contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned, here the dispositive issue is not the scope of the notice of appeal, which is to be liberally construed. Rather, a broader question controls: whether Rule 304(a) gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review the substitution rulings. It does not. Regardless of the language in the notice of appeal, the substitution orders are not final orders, the only category of orders reviewable under Rule 304(a).

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded its opinion affirming the appellate court’s dismissal of a portion of petitioner’s appeal by acknowledging petitioner’s argument that, because all orders entered after an erroneous denial of substitution are a nullity, earlier review of a substitution order may promote judicial efficiency – perhaps not here, where the case had been litigated for over 10 years. Regardless, quoting its precedent, the Court stated that “[p]rinciples of judicial economy may not trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by” a supreme court rule.

People v. Chatman, 2024 IL 129133

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In January 2020, Michael Chatman was charged with first degree murder in the shooting death of Ricky Green. The incident in question occurred when Green, Chatman, and another man, Michael Simmons, fled from a vehicle stop. Green was shot while fleeing. Initially, Chatman was charged only with obstruction of justice and possession of a weapon recovered from the vehicle. Chatman pled guilty to those charges and was sentenced to a term of probation.

Subsequently, however, a man named Dee Collins was arrested on a traffic warrant. When questioned by the police, Collins told them that he had been with Chatman the morning after Green’s shooting and that Chatman admitted shooting and killing Green. According to Collins, Chatman had already been planning to steal a gun from Green prior to the vehicle stop. While the men were fleeing, Chatman grabbed Green’s gun. And, Chatman then shot Green when he tried to take the gun back. Collins’ statement was video-recorded, and Chatman was later arrested for Green’s murder.

Prior to Chatman’s murder trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit Collins’ out-of-court statement under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine because they would be unable to secure his attendance at trial. In support of that motion, the State produced recorded jail phone calls between Chatman and family members discussing the need to make sure Collins did not testify. The State also introduced evidence that Collins reported receiving threats about his involvement in the case. Collins subsequently moved to Iowa and ultimately stopped responding to police calls and inquiries. The police testified about their efforts to locate Collins, including posting on a local law-enforcement message board, attempting to text and call Collins without success, and visiting his former addresses without making contact. The circuit court granted the State’s motion, finding that the police had made reasonable good-faith efforts to locate Collins without success, and thus he was unavailable. Collins’ statement was introduced at trial, and Chatman was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, Chatman challenged the admission of Collins’ statement, arguing that the State failed to show it had made a good-faith effort to secure Collins’ presence at trial. In the appellate court, the State countered by arguing that the State need not make good-faith efforts to secure a witness’ testimony if his statements are being admitted under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, relying on People v. Golden, 2021 IL App (2d) 200207. The appellate court disagreed with the State on that point but went on to find that the State had demonstrated such good-faith efforts and affirmed Chatman’s conviction.

In the Supreme Court, the State abandoned its reliance on Golden, and the Supreme Court ultimately overruled that portion of Golden which held that the proponent of statements of an unavailable witness under Rule 804(b)(5) need not demonstrate good-faith efforts at securing the witness’ attendance. The Court clarified that when the State seeks to introduce hearsay under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, it must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both that the witness is unavailable and that reasonable, good-faith efforts were made to secure the witness’ presence at trial.

The Illinois Supreme Court then affirmed the decisions below finding that such good-faith efforts were shown here. The record demonstrated that Collins had received threats from Chatman’s family and friends. He moved to Iowa to escape those threats and, while he initially stayed in contact with the police, his whereabouts later became unknown. The police attempted to call Collins, text him, and locate him at his former addresses and at his brother’s address, all to no avail. The police made a posting on a law enforcement information board accessible by local agencies, and the posting was viewed hundreds of times without any contact being reported. Ultimately, it appeared Collins did not want to be found. The Court concluded that while the State’s efforts to locate Collins might not have been extraordinary, they were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, there was no error in admitting Collins’ video-recorded statement at Chatman’s trial.