The Supreme Court of Missouri, in a case filed against a healthcare provider defendant, has upheld the constitutionality of Missouri’s statutory noneconomic damage cap. The Velazquez v. University Physician Associates case had been closely monitored by various stakeholders, because the case has significant implications for patients and healthcare providers, as well as other litigants. The Court also analyzed another important cap related issue in determining which cap year is appropriate to apply the statutory cost of living escalator to account for inflation.
Procedurally, the case involved cross-appeals from plaintiff as to the trial court’s reduction of damages, and the healthcare provider defendants’ appeal of the plaintiff verdict on several grounds. The plaintiff had alleged negligence in the cesarean delivery of her child and in her postpartum care. The jury found in plaintiff’s favor, allocating 100% of fault to the physician defendants. The jury awarded $30,000 in economic damages and $1 million in noneconomic damages. The trial court granted the physicians’ Motions for Remittitur asking the court to reduce the total noneconomic damage award to $400,000. The plaintiff opposed these Motions by making a constitutional objection and arguing that the higher noneconomic damage cap amount for “catastrophic” personal injury applied. The trial court did not find the noneconomic damage caps to be unconstitutional and agreed with plaintiff that the higher cap amount applied, thereby reducing the noneconomic damage award from $1M to $748,828 (using the 2019 cap year because that was the trial year).
The Noneconomic Damage Caps Do Not Violate
the Missouri Constitution’s Right to Trial by Jury
On appeal, plaintiff argued the noneconomic damage caps violated her constitutional right to trial by jury as it existed at common law before the State Constitution’s first adoption in 1820. The Court addressed and rejected this same argument in the 2012 Sanders v. Ahmed decision, where the Court held that wrongful death is a statutory cause of action that did not exist at common law, and therefore the Legislature has the power to define the remedy available (and impose damage caps) since it created the cause of action. The Sanders decision reached the opposite conclusion of the 2012 Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Center case, in which the Court declared the noneconomic damage caps unconstitutional in medical negligence actions because they were common law claims rather than statutory claims.
The Velazquez Court found that Watts did not control because in 2015, the Legislature amended certain statutes to provide a new statutory cause of action to replace the common law claim for damages against a healthcare provider. The Court found the Legislature has the authority to abolish common-law causes of action, as it had done before when it abolished certain common-law negligence claims against employers by enacting a statutory workers’ compensation scheme. Thus, because all medical negligence actions are now statutory causes of action, and the Legislature has the authority to enact statutory noneconomic damage caps, the current noneconomic damage caps do not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury.
Judge Draper was the lone dissenter from the Court’s ruling, arguing that the principal opinion provides the Legislature with unfettered authority to limit the constitutional right to trial by jury through hostile legislation when, in fact, Missouri voters are the only ones with the power to change the Constitution. In his view, the 2015 statutory revisions were a “blatant end run” around the Missouri Constitution’s right of trial by jury because they converted the common law medical malpractice cause of action into a statutory one merely to impose the same statutory caps the Court previously struck down for infringing on the right to trial by jury. Judge Draper argues that the principal opinion erodes the right of trial by jury to a mere privilege that may be withdrawn by legislative prerogative.
The Applicable Noneconomic Damage Cap is Based on Trial Year
Rather than Year of Underlying Injury
The Velazquez Court rejected the healthcare provider defendants’ argument that applying the noneconomic damage cap at the time of trial (2019 – $748,828) – rather than the cap in effect at the time of the alleged injury (2015 – $700,000) – violated protections afforded by the Missouri Constitution against retrospective application of law.
Noting that § 538.210.8, RSMo. “unambiguously express[ed] the legislative intent that a plaintiff’s non-economic damages award be protected from inflation,” the annual adjustment for inflation merely affected a procedure or remedy and did not run afoul of the constitutional proscription against retrospective laws. As a result, the Court held that the determination of the applicable noneconomic damage cap year is based on the time of trial, not the time of injury, and upheld the trial court’s reduction of the noneconomic damages to $748,828 using the 2019 cap year.
The Velazquez decision is an important victory for Missouri healthcare providers because it affirms the constitutionality of the noneconomic damage caps in cases against healthcare provider defendants. This affords the parties in those cases greater predictability in in terms of case value. The decision also provides courts and litigants clarity as to which cap year applies to pending and future cases.