In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Thomas E. Tharp, et al. v. St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee’s Summit, LLC, overturned a $2.3M verdict and granted a new trial after the unusual step of holding a rehearing and vacating an earlier opinion.
In February 2019, the Court overturned a jury verdict in favor of a patient and his wife against a surgery center because there was no proof the surgery center negligently granted staff privileges to a surgeon. Though other Missouri courts had recognized the existence of a negligent credentialing cause of action, this opinion was the first from the Supreme Court of Missouri to address the essential elements of such a claim.
At the rehearing, the plaintiffs claimed they possessed additional evidence which, if presented upon retrial, would allow them to make a submissible case of negligent credentialing. This purportedly includes evidence of low scores the surgeon received on continuing medical education exams, thus suggesting an inability to retain essential knowledge necessary to competently perform surgery. This also purportedly includes evidence of the surgeon’s litigation history showing he was sued more frequently as he aged, and expert witness testimony regarding the significance of the statistics. The Court did not take a position on the admissibility of this proffered new evidence, or its probative value (which is for a jury to decide), but the Court found this sort of evidence could possibly support a finding that the surgeon was incompetent or generally careless, which is the required standard for a negligent credentialing claim.
The Court said it decided to hold a rehearing and order a new trial because it would be manifestly unfair to deny the plaintiffs a new trial when they did not know and could not have known what evidence the Court would require to make a submissible case. Legal precedent requires remand for a new trial if the plaintiff’s legal failure was caused not by a strategic decision, avoidable or invited error, but by an extrinsic factor outside the plaintiff’s control. One such extrinsic factor is ignorance of the evidence necessary to support a cause of action when there is no statute or binding appellate precedent setting forth same. As mentioned above, though other Missouri courts have recognized the existence of a negligent credentialing cause of action, no court had addressed the essential elements or evidence required. Thus, the Court found the plaintiffs’ legal failure justifiable and not punishable in the absence of guidance from the Court.
This is the first ruling of its kind to provide guidance to Missouri lower courts and practitioners prosecuting or defending a negligent credentialing claim. These claims are difficult to prove, as they require proof beyond that which is required to support a direct medical negligence claim. Absent credible evidence of a physician’s incompetence generally, and the negligent failure of a healthcare facility to discover the incompetence and act accordingly, courts should dispose of these claims via dispositive motion. Further, it is not enough to prove that but for the credentialing, the physician could not have performed the conduct that produced the injury. Rather, a plaintiff must prove the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the physician’s incompetence.
This opinion did not address whether the negligent credentialing theory conflicts with V.A.M.S. § 538.210.4 (2017), which provides, in part, that “[n]o health care provider whose liability is limited by the provisions of this chapter shall be liable to any plaintiff based on the actions or omissions of any other entity or individual who is not an employee of such health care provider . . . .” Negligent credentialing liability necessarily depends on negligent actions or omissions of a non-employee physician. In the event this argument is raised, it is unclear how the Court would address the apparent conflict of law.